Chance-Constrained Equilibrium in Electricity Markets With Asymmetric Forecasts

We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy production but use private information about the forecast error distribution. This information is given in the form of samples and incorporated into profit-maximizing optimizations of market participants through chance constraints. We model information asymmetry by varying the sample size of participants' private information. We show that with more information available, the equilibrium gradually converges to the ideal solution provided by the perfect information scenario. Under information scarcity, however, we show that the market converges to the ideal equilibrium if participants are to infer the forecast error distribution from the statistical properties of the data at hand or share their private forecasts

Electricity Market Equilibrium under Information Asymmetry

We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the probability distribution of this uncertainty is not identical at the day-ahead stage. We show a high sensitivity of the equilibrium solution to the level of information asymmetry and demonstrate economic, operational, and computational value for the system stemming from potential information sharing

Unit Commitment Predictor With a Performance Guarantee: A Support Vector Machine Classifier

The system operators usually need to solve large-scale unit commitment problems within limited time frame for computation. This paper provides a pragmatic solution, showing how by learning and predicting the on/off commitment decisions of conventional units, there is a potential for system operators to warm start their solver and speed up their computation significantly. For the prediction, we train linear and kernelized support vector machine classifiers, providing an out-of-sample performance guarantee if properly regularized, converting to distributionally robust classifiers. For the unit commitment problem, we solve a mixed-integer second-order cone problem. Our results based on the IEEE 6-bus and 118-bus test systems show that the kernelized SVM with proper regularization outperforms other classifiers, reducing the computational time by a factor of 1.7. In addition, if there is a tight computational limit, while the unit commitment problem without warm start is far away from the optimal solution, its warmly started version can be solved to optimality within the time limit

A Consensus-ADMM Approach for Strategic Generation Investment in Electricity Markets

This paper addresses a multi-stage generation investment problem for a strategic (price-maker) power producer in electricity markets. This problem is exposed to different sources of uncertainty, including short-term operational (e.g., rivals' offering strategies) and long-term macro (e.g., demand growth) uncertainties. This problem is formulated as a stochastic bilevel optimization problem, which eventually recasts as a large-scale stochastic mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem with limited computational tractability. To cope with computational issues, we propose a consensus version of alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM), which decomposes the original problem by both short- and long-term scenarios. Although the convergence of ADMM to the global solution cannot be generally guaranteed for MILP problems, we introduce two bounds on the optimal solution, allowing for the evaluation of the solution quality over iterations. Our numerical findings show that there is a trade-off between computational time and solution quality

Dynamic Pricing in an Energy Community Providing Capacity Limitation Services

This paper proposes a mathematical framework for dynamic pricing in an energy community to enable the provision of capacity limitation services to the distribution grid. In this framework, the energy community complies with a time-variant limit on its maximum power import from the distribution grid in exchange for grid tariff discounts. A bi-level optimization model is developed to implicitly coordinate the energy usage of prosumers within the community. In the upper-level problem, the community manager minimizes the total operational cost of the community based on reduced grid tariffs and power capacity limits by setting time-variant and prosumer-specific prices. In the lower-level problem, each prosumer subsequently adjusts their energy usage over a day to minimize their individual operational cost. This framework allows the community manager to maintain central economic market properties such as budget balance and individual rationality for prosumers. We show how the community benefits can be allocated to prosumers either in an equal or a proportional manner. The proposed model is eventually reformulated into a mixed integer second-order cone program and thereafter applied to a distribution grid case study

Incentivizing Data Sharing for Energy Forecasting: Analytics Markets with Correlated Data

Reliably forecasting uncertain power production is beneficial for the social welfare of electricity markets by reducing the need for balancing resources. Describing such forecasting as an analytics task, the current literature proposes analytics markets as an incentive for data sharing to improve accuracy, for instance by leveraging spatio-temporal correlations. The challenge is that, when used as input features for forecasting, correlated data complicates the market design with respect to the revenue allocation, as the value of overlapping information is inherently combinatorial. We develop a correlation-aware analytics market for a wind power forecasting application. To allocate revenue, we adopt a Shapley value-based attribution policy, framing the features of agents as players and their interactions as a characteristic function game. We illustrate that there are multiple options to describe such a game, each having causal nuances that influence market behavior when features are correlated. We argue that no option is correct in a general sense, but that the decision hinges on whether the market should address correlations from a data-centric or model-centric perspective, a choice that can yield counter-intuitive allocations if not considered carefully by the market designer.Comment: 15 pages, 9 figures, 1 tabl